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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
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5	In the Matter of:
6	LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC., et al.
7	Debtors.
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12	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
13	One Bowling Green
14	New York, New York
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16	September 27, 2012
17	10:03 AM
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21	BEFORE:
22	HON. JAMES M. PECK
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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25	ECRO: TIFFANY

Page 2 HEARING re One Hundred Forty-Third Omnibus Objection to Claims (Late-Filed Claims) [ECF No. 16856] HEARING re Three Hundred Twenty-Ninth Omnibus Objection to Claims (Misclassified Claims) [ECF No. 29324] Transcribed by: Sheila Orms

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Page 4 TELEPHONE APPEARANCES: ANATOLY BUSHLER, FARALLON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT MICHAEL NEWMEISTER, STUTMAN, TREISTER & GLATT, FOR ELLIOTT TEL LEV-ARI, PRO SE

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Be seated, please.

MR. HORWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor, Maurice

Horwitz, Weil Gotshal & Manges on behalf of Lehman Brothers

Holdings, Inc. as plan administrator.

The first item on today's agenda is a carryover from the 143rd omnibus objection to claims, which sought to disallow certain claims on the grounds that they were filed after the bar date in violation of the bar date order in these cases.

Today LBHI is proceeding as to seven claims on the 143rd objection. All seven of these claims, which are based on Lehman program securities were filed on February 4th, 2010. That's approximately three months after the bar date applicable to Lehman program securities, which was November 2nd, 2009.

Nine were responses were filed in connection with these claims, and the plan administrator filed an omnibus reply to these responses this past Monday, that's ECF No. 31068.

I should correct one thing misstated in the reply, which is that we state that the claimants do not plead excusable neglect citing Pioneer. In fact, seven of the responses do cite to Pioneer, and provide a reason for the delay in their response.

The plan administrator in evaluating each of the responses has considered based upon the reasons given in all nine responses, whether the claimants would be able to satisfy the rigorous standard of excusable neglect in the Second Circuit. Having reviewed the responses, the plan administrator has concluded that the claimants do not satisfy the standard for excusable neglect, and that the claims should be expunged.

As this Court is aware, in Pioneer, the U.S.

Supreme Court held that the determination of whether neglect is excusable is an equitable one, and that Courts should consider four factors in making this determination. One, the prejudice to the debtors; two, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; three, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the claimant; and four, whether the claimant acted in good faith.

Significantly, the Second Circuit does not give equal weight to all four factors. The third factor, the reason for the delay is the most important. And the determination will typically turn on the reason for the delay.

The nine responses that were filed all point to the same reason for the delay, which is a breakdown in communication between the claimants, their banks, and their

purported advisor, an entity called Deminor International which filed seven responses on behalf of each of the claimants. In these responses, Deminor states that the claims were late because the bank thought that the claimant would file the claim, whereas the claimant thought that the bank would file the claim.

Two of the claimants also filed their own responses, Francois Bernier and Claude Fitvoye. These responses are somewhat difficult to follow. One is actually handwritten in French. Both appear to confirm that there was indeed a fatal breakdown of communication among these parties.

Both claimants state that they obtained blocking numbers and any other necessary documentation, such as powers of attorney, and forwarded these documents to Deminor, authorizing Deminor to file the claims on their behalf.

It therefore appears that these two claimants did not think that their bank would file their claims, but rather that Deminor was going to file the claims. In fact, in the case of Mr. Fitvoye he attaches a letter from Citibank dated October 15th, 2009, which confirms with him his preference for Citibank to file a claim on his behalf, and stating that he or a third party would be responsible for the filing.

Your Honor, the miscommunication among these parties is the only reason offered to explain why the claims were filed nearly three months after the applicable bar date. Neither the claimants, nor their purported adviser argue that any other Pioneer factors weigh in their favor. They do not allege confusion or lack of notice regarding the application of the bar date to their claims. And they apparently knew to follow the procedures to obtain blocking numbers for the claims, as required by the bar date order. Nevertheless, the proofs of claims were -- the proofs of claim were not filed until February of 2010.

Any one of the claimants, their banks or their advisors could have filed proofs of claim on behalf of the claimants. The debtors recognized that the issuance of Lehman program securities involves a number of different parties from account holders, to holders, to clearing agencies, and so on. And for this reason, the bar date order provides that claims based on Lehman program securities shall not be disallowed on the ground that such claims were not filed by the proper party or an authorized agent.

Despite this, the proofs of claim were not received on or before the applicable bar date is required by the bar date order. Indeed, according to Deminor, and as it states in its response, it was not until January of 2010 that the

claimants even realized that the proofs of claim had never been filed.

The claimants failure to communicate with their advisors and their failure to follow-up and ensure that the proofs of claim had been timely filed is a factor entirely within the reasonable control of the claimants, and does not alone support a finding of excusable neglect.

As noted in LBHI's reply, this Court has previously considered this very type of miscommunication, in which claimant's advisors and other parties involved in the ownership of Lehman program securities failed to agree or communicate effectively among themselves as to who would file a guarantee claim against LBHI.

In a reported decision cited in our papers, this Court found that such miscommunication, carelessness, or inattention to detail, or in -- pardon me, inattention to the guarantee claim was entirely within the control of the claimant and its advisors, and did not establish excusable neglect.

Here, Your Honor, the plan administrator submits that the Court should follow its prior decision and find that in these circumstances as well, the claimants have not made a sufficient showing for a finding of excusable neglect. Accordingly, unless the Court has any questions, the plan administrator respectfully requests that the 143rd

omnibus objection to claims be granted with respect to the claims listed on Exhibit B of LBHI's reply.

THE COURT: It's a very complete and compelling argument, but I do have a few questions for you.

One frankly relates to whether there can ever be a case of excusable neglect under these circumstances. What should or could the claimants have done under these circumstances, given the fact that there was a dropped ball, a failure to file, but an intention to file, compliance with the blocking number requirements, and general reliance upon others to do what, I suppose the claimants assumed would be done without having clarified exactly who would do it.

What could a claimant do in order to satisfy the Pioneer standards? Have you thought about that? Because one of the things that bothers me is that this is almost a per se problem, the failure to file timely appears not to have any excuse, forget excusable neglect.

MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, one thing that I have considered and I think sort of eluded to in saying what the bar date order -- that the bar date order provides, that the debtors wouldn't object, or that the claim wouldn't be disallowed on the grounds that the wrong party filed the claim.

The claimants could have themselves filed proofs of claim and instructed everybody to file a proof of claim on

their behalf, so that at least somebody would have indicated the claimant's intention to hold LBHI liable for a guarantee issued in respect to the securities that they held. They could have done that and didn't. That is one thing that they could have done.

THE COURT: Is it your position that if they had acted more promptly that would've been some indication that they were more diligently pursuing their rights? Is the fact that there's a uniform three month delay here a factor to be considered?

MR. HORWITZ: I think it's a factor to be considered in demonstrating the opposite, just their failure to -- their inattention to detail with respect to these claims. I don't think that if they had acted promptly and managed to file the claims a week later that the claims would be anymore timely than they are now.

THE COURT: I recognize that they're not timely.

But let's just -- I'm trying to explore with you how to most properly draw a line that does allow for excusable neglect when a good reason has been shown for it. And to see if there is any reason, other than the one you've identified which is filing multiple claims, to grant relief in a case of a late filed claim based upon Lehman program securities.

Is it your position that this is an absolute date which if missed is not subject to any reasonable excuse?

MR. HORWITZ: The -- any claimant is free to assert that it is -- that excusable neglect is present, but I hesitate to provide claimants whose claims have yet to be scheduled for hearing with options to -- for them to assert that perhaps they haven't thought of, for why their claims should be allowed.

This Court has previously allowed, I believe, has allowed claims recognizing that in some circumstances it's possible for a claimant not to have known whether the provisions of the bar date order applied to their claims, and that the November 2nd bar date applied to their claims as opposed to the October bar date.

But in these circumstances, the problem is that it's clear from the response as filed that the claimants had absolutely no confusion about the application of the bar date order. They understood it very well.

You know, if they failed -- if everybody failed -- dropped the ball, it was not just one ball, everybody had the opportunity to file a claim, if nobody did anything, it's really difficult for the debtors to have any sympathy for this -- for these circumstances.

THE COURT: I guess the question comes down to this. Is it excusable neglect for a party that wants very much to comply with the bar date not to have provided clear and unambiguous instructions to one party or another to file

the claim on time?

MR. HORWITZ: That would. I don't think that would lead to a finding of excusable neglect that the party didn't give clear instructions to their agent. I mean, it was really -- it's really the responsibility of the claimant. I think it really goes to what -- I mean, what is the claimant responsible for, either to file the claim or to clearly instruct any authorized agent to file the claim on their behalf.

THE COURT: See, we've had situations in the past involving employees within the same global organization who assumed that one or the other was going to be responsible for the filing of a proof of claim, and I found that that was not, based upon the facts presented, sufficient for excusable neglect.

One of the things that may distinguish this, and

I'm just exploring it with you, is that in each instance

we're dealing with individual securities holders, all

located outside the United States, all seeking to comply

with what I'll describe as unconventional provisions in

reference to a proof of claim because they involve the need

to get a blocking number to deal with claims arising under

Lehman program securities, a unique kind of investment. And

they actually took steps to file the claim through agents.

And then didn't do more until it was too late.

And I'm wondering if you're able to give me more comfort that I currently have that, in fact, my prior rulings apply to this situation, and should be applied to this situation. That's part one of my question.

Part two of my question is whether it would truly prejudice Lehman and its estate during this phase of the bankruptcy for these individuals to be found to have actually complied with the excusable neglect standard, because they did up to the point of the filing date everything they believed necessary to comply.

MR. HORWITZ: Just answer the -- I'll take the questions in order. One thing I'll point out is that, this is actually something that Deminor points out in their response, I haven't verified this, but they state that they did file -- they managed to file proofs of claim on behalf of all their other clients. And I don't believe this is the only example of Lehman program securities being filed on behalf of claimants by either an advisor or bank. That is to say, if every other or most other claimants or holders of Lehman program securities were able to effectively communicate among themselves and their advisors and file timely claims, that to me is an indication that it's something within the realm of possibility. Well within the realm of possibility for most holders of these securities.

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timely claims are anymore sophisticated, or at least any -most of them are probably about the same level of
sophistication as these claimants.

THE COURT: We haven't really touched on this and before you get to the prejudice question, I want to ask you this delicate question. Is this a situation of potential advisor malpractice?

MR. HORWITZ: That is, I will say -- just to preface my answer, I don't really know the relationship between Deminor and the claimants other than what Deminor states in its papers. I don't know under what law that relationship has been memorialized, if it has been memorialized. I note that Deminor is located in Brussels. These claimants are located throughout Europe, so I wouldn't know just under what rules would apply to the relationship between Deminor and the claimants. If --

THE COURT: I agree with you, I have no idea.

MR. HORWITZ: If this were -- if these were my clients, that might be a different question, and it would be something I'd be concerned about as an attorney, but I just don't know what rules apply to Deminor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, let's go to the question of prejudice to Lehman, an entity which has just announced the distribution of another 10 plus billion dollars to creditors, and it has in the past distributed

some 22 and a half billion dollars. So we're talking about a distribution scheme that's well under way. How does allowing these claims impact a 65 billion dollar plus estate?

MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, the prejudice element is, I think I've stated before, it applies not only to the debtors but other creditors. There are other creditors whose claims have been expunged already for this very reason. Either because they didn't respond to an objection, or if they did, I mean, there's at least one whose claim was expunged in a reported decision. That reported decision now has given notice to everyone else that's a creditor in these cases that they shouldn't bother to try to file a late claim on the grounds that they realized they miscommunicated with their advisors.

I don't know specifically how many claims, late claims remain that would -- where the circumstances would be the same as these, but I do know there are a few still set -- yet to be set for hearing where claimants have said there was a miscommunication among the advisor and the claimant and the bank.

In addition, claimants continue to file late claims. We continue to file objections to claims that are filed three years after the bar date, four years after the bar date. And I have -- and we don't know how many

claimants who are out there that might see a decision entered allowing these claims because this was found to be an excusable neglect and might decide that it's time for their claims to be considered for the same reasons.

Because I can't quantify that, I can't say exactly what the prejudice would be, but that would impact -- it could impact, at least the administration of the claims in these cases, which continues to be -- it's a work in progress that will take a long time to complete.

As far as late claims just in general, there are still over \$200 million worth of asserted claims filed by claimants who filed their claims after the bar date and have yet to be set for hearing. We're going through them one-by-one and considering each response very carefully, and ensuring that we can set them for hearing on dates that claimants say that they'll be able to attend.

So a decision like this could impact any one of those claims, just because in each one, there's a -- some variation of I was confused, or I, you know -- and some of them may involve attorneys who didn't file claims on time. So it would give people a hook that the debtors certainly haven't anticipated it after the reported decision that found these circumstances not to be excusable neglect.

UNIDENTIFIED: (indiscernible) was any of the

THE COURT: Okay. And one more question --

Page 18 1 payments have (indiscernible) respond? 2 THE COURT: You're going to have to identify 3 yourself. I didn't even realize that somebody was --4 MS. ARI: Apologies. My name is Tel Lev Ari. I'm 5 claim number 65858 (indiscernible) so I'm not even sure 6 (indiscernible) my claim, but I'm one of the claimants that 7 (indiscernible). 8 THE COURT: I'm -- is this a claimant that's on the 9 list? 10 MR. HORWITZ: This claim has not been set for 11 hearing today. 12 MS. ARI: Oh (indiscernible) this is why I'm 13 calling. 14 THE COURT: Where are you located? 15 MS. ARI: I'm located in the UK which is why 16 (indiscernible) saying that the hearing is scheduled for 17 today. 18 THE COURT: Well, I don't know when your claim is scheduled for hearing, but it's not on the notice of matters 19 20 to be heard this morning. So --21 MS. ARI: Okay. 22 THE COURT: -- I'm looking at the behavior of the 23 lawyers who are representing Lehman, I can tell that they're 24 confused as to why you're on the line right now. I know 25 So nothing is going to happen that will affect that I am.

Page 19 1 your claim today, because I'm not deciding any issues with 2 respect to it, and I haven't prepared to do that. I don't 3 know the facts of your claim. 4 MS. ARI: Okay. So (indiscernible). 5 THE COURT: So --MS. ARI: (indiscernible) my hearing? 7 THE COURT: Well, my suggestion is that you contact 8 counsel for Lehman at Weil Gotshal & Manges and try to find 9 out the status of your claim and when it's going to be 10 scheduled for further hearing. But you're certainly welcome 11 to continue to listen, but I'm not going to be deciding any 12 issues that relate to you today. 13 MS. ARI: Okay. No, I appreciate (indiscernible) 14 but thank you, and I will be (indiscernible). 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 16 MR. BOWMANS: Hello, Your Honor. (indiscernible) 17 on the line on behalf of Deminor. 18 THE COURT: That's fine. I'm going to give you an 19 opportunity to speak in just a moment. 20 MR. BOWMANS: Thank you very much. 21 THE COURT: I wanted to ask one more question of 22 Mr. Horowitz before turning this over to you or to any other 23 claimant or claimant representative who wishes to be heard 24 on this issue. And that is, I read the handwritten petition 25 that was in French, and I couldn't understand it, and didn't

have a translation for it. Have you had it translated? Do you know what it says?

MR. HORWITZ: I do know what it says. I can --

THE COURT: Can you give me the substance of it as best you can --

MR. HORWITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: -- recognizing that I don't accept it as anything other than your best attempt to paraphrase the meaning.

MR. HORWITZ: This is the response of Claude

Fitvoye. He says that he obtained -- he says that his bank
obtained a settlement for him for a certain amount, but that
it was not satisfactory to him, that he thinks he deserves
more. He took the steps necessary to obtain a blocking
number and forwarded this information to Deminor. He states
that he was -- happened to be out of town during the week
that he -- that I guess it was Citibank sent him a letter
with the blocking number, so he wasn't able to forward it to
Deminor in time for Deminor to file the claim on his behalf.
That's basically the substance of his response.

The one thing that I found confusing about this is that despite -- yet he said he forwarded this information to Deminor a few days after the bar date past, in fact, I think the day after, because the day before was a holiday. But the claims were still not filed until February 4th, 2010,

his claim still not filed until February 4th, 2010.

I don't know based on his response or Deminor's response what transpired between that date and the date that the claims were actually filed. Deminor on behalf of Mr. Fitvoye also says that it was not until January 2010 that the claimants realized that the claims had not been filed and contacted Deminor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you for that. And is this Mr. Bowmans (ph) who's on the line for Deminor?

MR. BOWMANS: Yes, that's me, thank you.

THE COURT: I'll hear what you have to say, sir.

MR. BOWMANS: Okay. Well, I first of all wanted to clarify (indiscernible) to the relationship between Deminor and these clients, more in particular the persons for whom we objected. Deminor is a firm that is consisting (indiscernible) in various kind of situations where they have lost money, and we try to recover those monies for them, and mostly in Europe, but in this case, part of the work had to be done in the U.S. Actually these persons of the Lehman securities (indiscernible) and they claim that they didn't receive right information about a product that they bought and the risk. And so our mandate from these clients was to try to recover some of the money that they had lost not from Lehman Brothers itself, but from the banks who had sold these products to them in their own country.

And in this case, all these persons are (indiscernible) persons who bought their securities I think from Citibank.

Now, we were in discussions with Citibank

(indiscernible) the end of 2009 with regards to a possible settlement. And the settlement was actually reached in early 2010.

Some of the clients mandated us (indiscernible)

Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (indiscernible) our clients

mandated us much later, and some at the end of 2009. I do

not know in particular for all these clients here whom we're

discussing about when precisely they (indiscernible).

And when we heard about the need to file proof of claim to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, we wrote a letter to our clients saying that we were at their disposal if they had questions, if they wanted us to assist them, but that this was (indiscernible) would normally be taken care of by the bank. And that the bank had to get the blocking number, that the bank would send to them, and that if they wanted us to do something for them, to help them file the claim for them, then we needed to have a power of attorney from them, and we needed to get the blocking number that the bank had communicated to them because we needed that information in order to fill out the claim forms.

Now, it seems that some persons have misunderstood communication or have been confused by the communication

they were getting from their bank, and what they were getting from us. And I'm absolutely open about it, and some persons have not been able to either they didn't understand or some understood (indiscernible) not being able to send the power of attorney or the blocking number to us in due time. And that's why the filing was not made.

When the settlement was done with Citibank Belgium in January 2010, with the payment (indiscernible) generated and this explains probably why we wrote you a letter in February, and some of these clients didn't receive the full amount of the settlement because the settlement was composed of damages on the one hand, and the price for taking over the Lehman securities.

And for those clients (indiscernible) appears that no regular finding had been made, Citibank said for these clients, we'll only pay the damages part, we will not pay the part that we consider the failing of the underlying securities. That's when we understood that for these clients no regular claim had been filed. And that's when we immediately -- when we understood that this was the case, we filed, we sent the letter to the Lehman bankruptcy to file the claim.

Now, what happened between the end of November and the February letter, these people (indiscernible) information to us, asking whether the claim form had been

Page 24 1 filed or not. We don't think so. We don't think that we 2 were notified by them. We just filed all claim forms for 3 which we had received proper instructions and the blocking 4 number by the due date. And for some others for whom we 5 didn't receive information in time, we didn't file any 6 claim, and we took action when we understood that these 7 people were excluded at the beginning of February. 8 I think that explains the situation. THE COURT: Now --9 10 MR. BOWMANS: So clearly for these people, there's 11 never been an intention not to file, there's never been an 12 intention to be negligent. What we can say then 13 (indiscernible) is that it is a communication problem 14 between various parties about the steps that had to be taken 15 in order to comply with the (indiscernible). 16 THE COURT: All right. I have a couple of 17 questions for you, Mr. Bowmans. What is your position with 18 Deminor? 19 MR. BOWMANS: I'm a director at Deminor 20 International. 21 THE COURT: And you're located in Brussels? 22 MR. BOWMANS: Yes. 23 THE COURT: And you indicated that you, on behalf

of your client investors, reached a settlement with Citibank

in reference to Lehman program securities sold through

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Citibank to these investors; is that correct?

MR. BOWMANS: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: And was that a global settlement, in the sense that there was one settlement amount that you ended up allocating to your clients or was there a separate settlement for each of the investors based upon the facts and circumstances of their individual claims?

MR. BOWMANS: Actually, Citibank committed under the settlement agreement to pay -- to owe their clients 65 percent of the principal amount of the bond, plus the opportunity for the client to reinvest that money with Citibank at a very favorable interest rate, which that we valued the settlement and (indiscernible) 70 percent of the nominal value. And every client, in order to benefit from that settlement that we had negotiated, had to sign the settlement agreement. And upon signing of the settlement agreement, they transferred their securities to Citibank and then received the sum that was agreed, i.e., 65 percent plus the reinvestment (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Do you --

MR. BOWMANS: One of the conditions of the settlement agreement was that the claim form had to be -- that a proof of claim had been correctly filed with the Lehman bankruptcy.

THE COURT: So if I understand this correctly, at

the time of the settlement, which was entered into after the bar date; is that correct, or was it --

MR. BOWMANS: After discussions had started at the end of I think right before or right after when on November 2, it was in that period, that settlement discussions started. They lasted until early January, and then the settlement was (indiscernible).

THE COURT: All right. So if I understand this correctly, your clients potentially have suffered two adverse consequences in reference to this, I just want to be clear on this point.

MR. BOWMANS: Yes.

THE COURT: By virtue of the objection to the allowance of these late claims, they stand to lose not distributions in reference to the Lehman bankruptcy, but instead distributions that are at a notionally greater percentage recovery that would otherwise be payable by Citibank and that that is not available to them because their claims are not yet allowed claims in the bankruptcy; is that correct?

MR. BOWMANS: Because of the fact that the proof of claim was not correctly filed, the ownership of the securities was not transferred under the settlement agreement to Citibank. So the persons are still owners of those securities. They have received an amount of damages

and which is about 65 percent, but I believe it was reduced to 40 percent, but their (indiscernible) I would have to check because it's already almost two years ago. But they still remain owners of those securities, and if their claim is now rejected, and that will be (indiscernible) then still benefit from payments from the Lehman bankruptcy. I don't know if that's an answer to your question.

THE COURT: Well, it both answers it and confuses me a little bit. What I'm trying to understand is whether allowance of these late claims results in a payment obligation from Lehman or whether it simply allows the claimant to obtain a greater recovery from Citibank.

MR. BOWMANS: Okay. No, it's the -- it would not recover anything anymore from Citibank. That settlement is done and it's completed. If this claim will be allowed, then the owner of the securities will benefit from pay outs from the Lehman bankruptcy like any other owner of securities and still holds a claim, so there is no payment to be received from Citibank any longer.

THE COURT: Okay. And do you have other clients that engaged Deminor International to act on their behalf who fully complied with the bar date, and who has as a result of full compliance with the bar date, received the 65 percent more or less settlement from Citibank and transferred their securities to Citibank in accordance with

the arrangements you've described?

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MR. BOWMANS: Yes, absolutely, and that's the large majority of the clients. I think in total we had around 800 clients in Belgium, but not all of these clients were Citibank clients (indiscernible) had purchased securities from Deutsche Bank or (indiscernible) some other banks. And the large -- all except these I believe seven persons, and for all those we -- I have to be precise, we didn't file the claim form for all those 800 because I would say that the majority of these persons just asked the bank to file the claim for them. Citibank did file a claim form for a large group of its clients, including clients for whom we were acting. And some other clients wanted us to be involved in it, wanted us to do the claim form. They had lost confidence in their bank, they were in litigation for it, they had (indiscernible) to the bank. (Indiscernible) and they asked us to do it.

I don't know exactly the number of people for whom we filed claim form, must be a couple of hundred, maybe 200 or 300, or something like that. And then you have these seven persons for who no claim form was filed, neither by Citibank nor by us. And that's what we are trying to explain and we are extremely open on that. It is the problem of communication where the client, I believe, has not fully understood who would do what in this respect.

THE COURT: So do I understand from what you've just said that the vast majority of your clients numbering in the hundreds perhaps have no difficult in complying with the bar date, and in fact, did so or caused others to do so in their behalf by the deadline?

MR. BOWMANS: That's correct. And it's yeah, beyond any doubt.

THE COURT: And do you have any explanation other than the general statement of confusion or perhaps neglect, that resulted in these seven claimants not having filed their proofs of claim by the bar date?

MR. BOWMANS: (Indiscernible) things, but it's not neglect because these -- otherwise, these people would not have come to us to give the mandate to recover the monies from Citibank. And these sort of people who were fairly unhappy to the fact that they owned these securities that were sold to them, that they had never understood really what they were about.

So these were active investors, actively trying to recover their monies. And more precisely, these investors have not been able to give the instructions to us, I'm afraid I cannot tell you because I can only say that we didn't receive the necessary instructions in due time. And some people we -- I remember very well, it was a (indiscernible) period, a lot of investors were contacting

us at the time when these claim forms had to be sent to (indiscernible) and some of them had not yet entered into a contract with us, they were trying to understand how this recovery action would work, what they needed to do, and if they wanted to be part of it.

And we have not been able to contact all these persons by phone to say, look, we haven't received anything from you yet, you have to act et cetera. We have just -- you know, taking the instructions that we have received and done our job.

And, yes, after the fact it has appeared that some of these people didn't send us instructions, and I cannot say more about precise reasons why. I know that some people have (indiscernible) a holiday or (indiscernible). We don't know more about the precise (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to break in now and make a few comments about the procedural setting of today's hearing, and to ask some questions of debtor's counsel, which can be answered right now or after a period of reflection following a break.

But there are a couple of things that troubled me about where we are. One is, Mr. Bowmans is a very articulate spokesperson on behalf of Deminor International and its clients, and has provided a great deal of information that I did not have before we started this

process.

But he is speaking to me by telephone from

Brussels. He is not a witness who has been qualified to

testify today. It is unclear to me whether he is testifying

as, if you can call this discussion testimony, purely as a

fact witness or as a combined fact and expert witness. I

assume he's just a fact witness, but I don't know how he

knows everything that he knows. I don't know whether he was

personally involved in everything that he is describing, or

whether he is relating information that he has obtained from

others who work at Deminor, either as his colleagues or his

subordinates.

I don't know the specifics of the settlement that he has described with Citibank. I haven't seen that documentation. It may or may not be relevant to consider in deciding how to deal with these disputed claims. And I suppose that my greatest procedural hesitation at this moment relates to the fact that the record is not yet legitimate in the sense of including admissible evidence, although the statements made by Mr. Bowmans are certainly persuasive.

Whether or not they ultimately change the outcome is unclear. Whether the debtors would wish to examine Mr. Bowmans in a deposition under oath, or have testimony taken consistent with today's colloquy with him at a further

hearing, I don't know. Whether Mr. Bowmans practically could participate in the hearing after being sworn in accordance with the law of Belgium, and participate by video conference, so that he doesn't have to travel here is another possibility.

But it seems to me that I've heard enough to have more questions than I have answers about the matter that's before the Court right now. And one of the questions relates to the circumstances of each individual's confusion. This becomes a very difficult fact question that I'm not sure fits under the same category.

Mr. Bowmans is speaking on behalf of a class of firm clients, and really can't speak to what they did or didn't do or why they failed to do what virtually everybody else did. So at some level, the failure of this small group to do what everybody else in the class did is a negative fact from the perspective of these individuals.

And while Mr. Bowmans has provided a very helpful description of the context in which this arises, he is necessarily unable to state what each individual did or didn't do, why they dropped the ball. And in effect, each individual claimant's efforts to comply and individual story with a reference to how and why they were confused and whether anyone is responsible for that confusion remains to be developed.

In the response that counsel characterized by

Claude Fitvoye, which is in French and I can't read, but

could be translated, the characterization suggested that he

was away at the time, and without being specific because I

can't be at this juncture, appears to have relied on others

while he was away.

That may or may not change the legal analysis as to whether or not that's a good reason, but it raises the question as to whether each of these individuals may have some particularized set of circumstances to assert. The Deminor International papers are almost verbatim the same for each claimant, and necessarily fail to provide specifics.

So I'm left in something of a cloud on this. I'm not sure that I have a sufficient record. I may never have a sufficient record given language difficulties, geography, and the amounts involved which indicate that these mostly pro se claimants may have some difficulty in providing the information because they don't have counsel and they're foreigners.

So for all of these reasons, I'm going to reserve decision with respect to this, and give the debtors an opportunity to consider how most practically to proceed at this point. It occurs to me that Mr. Bowmans' a non-lawyer, may be a useful counterparty to engage in some set of

Page 34 1 procedures that may enable me to decide these issues with a 2 clearer record. I appreciate his time today, but I also 3 find that while accepting what he said as the functional 4 equivalent of testimony that he would give if he were sworn 5 as a witness, I remain unable to, in fact, treat it as sworn 6 testimony. And I also recognize that the debtors may need 7 an opportunity to examine him and, in effect, cross-examine 8 him with regard to what he said. 9 So for those reasons, this will be adjourned and 10 I'll give the debtors an opportunity to give some thought as 11 to how you want to deal with this at future hearings. 12 MR. HORWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And let me also ask just in case I've 14 left something out, if there's anyone else either in person, 15 in court or on the telephone who has anything to say with 16 regard to these matters that we've just talked about? 17 (No response) 18 THE COURT: Hearing nothing, we'll move on to the 19 next agenda item. 20 MR. HORWITZ: I'll turn the podium over to my 21 colleague, Mark Bernstein. 22 MR. BERNSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor, Mark 23 Bernstein from Weil on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holdings, 24 Inc. as plan administrator.

The next item on the agenda is the 329th omnibus

objection. This is a carryover from a prior hearing. -- the 329th omnibus objection relates to claims that were filed by employees that asserted priority under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.

LBHI is not here today contesting the merits of the claims or whether such claims are actually entitled to such priorities under 507. The 329th omnibus objection only seeks to reclassify any amounts asserted in the claims in excess of the caps provided in Section 507, in order to allow LBHI to more closely align their reserves with their -- what their maximum multiple distributions may be, and reserves all rights to object to these claims based on the merits and whether any parts of them are ultimately entitled to 502 priority in the future.

There were five responses filed to the objection. One of the responses that was initially scheduled for today's hearing was a response of Russell Schreiber and Andrew Weber. Those claims have other components as well that do not specifically relate to this objection, and we've been working with those claimants to resolve those claims in a separate fashion, so that this objection has been adjourned with respect to Mr. Schreiber and Weber.

With respect to Nikki Marshall and Riccardo Banchetti, they did file responses; however, their responses did not oppose the relief sought in this objection.

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sought to clarify that they weren't -- they still disputed the separate objection seeking to reclassify their restricted stock units as equity and we concede that this has no bearing on those objections in any way.

The two remaining responses that we received were the responses of Karen Simon Kreiger and Charles Kuykendall. The response of -- the claim of Ms. Kreiger is based on certain compensation that Ms. Kreiger received during her employment at Lehman starting in 2003 where she received a certain amount of restricted stock units, and also her holdings of common stock including in her 401K account.

Ms. Kreiger checked the box on her proof of claim indicating that her claim was entitled to priority under 507(a)(5) and also checked the "other" box.

Neither of these claims, whether they're RSUs or common stock is of the type entitled to priority under 507, but in any event, in this instance, we are -- they are -- to the extent they ever are, they are subject to the caps of 507(a). And as a result, we're seeking to reclassify just the portion in excess of the 10,950 cap that was in effect on the filing date.

Ms. Kreiger's response indicates that these amounts were discretionary deductions that were not part of her -- and were part of her income, and therefore, should be considered as lost compensation. We don't dispute that in

any way, and sounds accurate, but that doesn't mean the entire amount is entitled to priority, potentially just up to the caps set forth in 507.

The claim of Charles Kuykendall is a claim for deferred -- based on a deferred compensation plan that E.F. Hutton had created prior to its merger with Lehman. E.F. Hutton was acquired by Lehman at one point, and it is the debtor's belief that actually LBI did assume the obligations under this plan, and we've objected to this claim on the 173rd omnibus objection on those grounds.

Mr. Kuykendall did respond and we've adjourned that matter. He has requested some discovery and we're going to go through that process at some point. But in any event, today again we're just seeking to reclassify the portion of his claim in excess of the cap, and Mr. Kuykendall has stopped working even at E.F. Hutton in 1994, according to his papers, clearly none of that falls within the 180 day requirements of Section 507, and therefore, is not entitled to priority distributions.

I believe Ms. Kreiger is in the courtroom today and Mr. Kuykendall's attorney I believe said he was going to be dialing in. I'm happy to answer any questions Your Honor may have at this point.

THE COURT: I have no questions.

MR. WING: Your Honor, Steve Wing, I'm the attorney

for Mr. Kuykendall.

THE COURT: Well, you just jumped on lines because

I was about to say I have no questions at this time.

MR. WING: Sorry, Your Honor.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No problem, it's one of the problems of appearing by telephone.

What do you have to say?

MR. WING: Well, Your Honor, I think it's been succinctly stated that my client although he filed his claim pro se and indicated that it was covered as a priority claim under 507(a)(5), it wasn't (indiscernible) within the last 180 days. It isn't entitled to priority probably, and you know, that won't be finally determined until we actually get to address the merits of the claim which looks like it's going to be a long time down the road.

And so I don't see where we're accomplishing anything here, because to say that his claim should be split into a part that would be subject to the cap and a part that wouldn't be is kind of repudiated by what counsel for the debtor has just said. That they don't think that it would be (indiscernible) priority anyway, and therefore splitting the claim and having to potentially litigate two issues instead of one makes no sense at all. I don't see how it provides any progress or forward motion with regard to the

Chapter 11 plan.

They don't plan to allow this claim or make a decision as to allow this claim. They're not admitting that it qualifies under the statute as a priority claim. In fact, they're clearly denying it, and they may even be right. But they -- this motion doesn't even really apply to my client. And for that reason, I think it should be denied because it's not appropriate and the basis set forth, and the motion itself is inapplicable to my client and factually in error.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, the claim of Mr. Kuykendall was filed in the amount of \$348,273. Based on the terms of the Lehman plan, we are required to reserve that exact amount for it because it was filed as priority.

What the motion seeks to do is to determine that only in any circumstance up to 10,950 will be priority, we'll reserve 10,950 dollar-for-dollar, and then anything above the 10,950 the approximately 340,000 or 338,000 we've reserved based on his -- the distributions on -- as an unsecured claim on this claim.

So there is significant benefit to the debtors and will enable the debtors to make more significant distributions along with the other claims that were reclassified pursuant to this objection.

As to whether we agree or disagree whether it will

ultimately be determined as priority is something that can be determined in the future, and there's no reason that this objection needs to be held off until an ultimate determination on the merits or ultimate priority with respect to any priority of the claim is made.

THE COURT: It also sounds to me as if counsel for this claimant, for all practical purposes, acknowledges that there's some merit to the argument that this is not a priority claim.

The Court doesn't need to decide that one way or the other right now except to say that it is a material benefit to the estate that that which is being reserved as a priority claim be limited to the 507(a) cap, and not be unlimited in amount as reflected in the claim.

And so this objection will be allowed with respect to that issue. With the understanding that it doesn't in any way prejudice other issues concerning the treatment of Mr. Kuykendall's claim.

I would also suggest for what it may be worth, that since counsel is now involved on behalf of the claimant that some thoughtful attention to the claim might be worthwhile, and in recognition of the fact that anyone who worked for E.F. Hutton in 1994 could not possibly be asserting a priority claim today based upon anything I know, some thought might be given to reclassifying even the 507(a)

Page 41 1 portion by agreement. 2 MR. BERNSTEIN: Certainly, Your Honor. We'll reach 3 out to Mr. Kuykendall's counsel. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. BERNSTEIN: The other claimant is Ms. Kreiger, 6 who I said is in the courtroom today. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Kreiger. You can come 8 forward and speak to me from the podium. 9 MR. WING: Your Honor, since you're done with my 10 client, I'm going to end my involvement in the call. 11 THE COURT: That'll be fine, you can hang up. 12 MR. WING: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MS. KREIGER: Your Honor, going through my third 14 very public employer bankruptcy is just unconscionable. 15 Every effort was made by me to learn from the lessons of the 16 first and second bankruptcies at Drexel Bernel & Baher (ph) 17 and Centennial Government Securities respectively and 18 minimize my investment in an organization where I had a 19 dependency on my annual earning stream. 20 My employment with Lehman Brothers commenced in 21 November 1990. Unfortunately Lehman Brothers management 22 made a decision in 1994 shortly after became a publicly 23 traded firm to establish a stock award program that provides 24 every member of Lehman Brothers with an ownership interest 25 in the firm and a requirement that the stake be held for

five years.

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As noted in their annual stock award distribution to its employees, the program provides an incentive to think and act like an owner everyday, and allow all participants to share in the firm's financial success over time.

Upon further review of the Lehman Brothers stock award program documentation it states, "All bonus eligible members of the firm receive a portion of their compensation in restricted stock units. Each RSU represents the right to receive one share of the Lehman Brothers common stock five years after the RSU is granted. RSUs have been awarded to you as part of your annual bonus payable for the years' performance. The portion of the compensation paid in RSUs increases as the amount of your total compensation rises. On November 30th of each year, the restriction period will end and your vested RSUs will convert to Lehman Brothers common stock. Once your RSU converts to common stock, you may continue to hold those shares or sell them, subject to any compliance restrictions on employees trading Lehman The RSUs cannot be sold before conversion." Brothers stock.

The operating terms of the Lehman Brothers stock program have repeatedly communicated that it was funded through a mandatory deduction of a portion of our annual compensation, and therefore, should be treated as it is lost compensation in a priority secured claim.

Further supporting this is the notion that I was neither in any position to make a choice regarding my desire to become a participant, nor could I make any investment decisions during the restricted period. Choices to hold or sell the restricted stock units were only available after the completion of the vesting period.

In addition, all offer letters to new employees issued after the commencement of the Lehman Brothers stock award program included the following wording, "The performance year ending your compensation will be as follows, salary, bonus at the firm's option a portion of your current and future year's total compensation, combined salary, bonus, and other compensation will be paid in restricted stock units pursuant to the firm's employee stock award program as then in effect. While the above compensation commitments will be honored, this letter is not a contract of continuing employment."

In light of my previous employer's history and my personal circumstances of being a young widow with two children that I had to raise through college until adulthood, I chose to sell most of my restricted stock units each year in order to pay for their raising through to their college education and graduation.

While I most certainly thought and acted like an owner during my 18 years at Lehman Brothers everyday, the

management decision to establish this program handcuffed my ability to manage my RSU investments as I have managed my other investments. I was dependent upon decisions outside of my control.

My objection to the 329th omnibus motion is only associated to the restricted stock units where I have no ability to make prudent investment decisions. I have excluded those shares that I kept beyond the restricted period where I had a discretionary ability to make personal investment decisions.

In summary, I am asking the Court to rule that the portion of my claim associated to the unvested restrict stock units which equated to \$164,319.52 be treated as if it was lost compensation and a priority secured claim. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Kreiger. What's the debtor's position with regard to this? I think I probably know it, because we've heard a lot about RSUs in other hearings.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Certainly, Your Honor. Mark Bernstein again from Weil on behalf of Lehman.

The claims of Ms. Kreiger that relate to restricted stock units are being handled in the group with the other restricted stock unit claims. Ms. Kreiger has been involved and has signed the -- signed up to participate in the

discovery that is ongoing and we spoke earlier. She hasn't been able to get access to the data room, but we'll certainly work with her to get access, but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERNSTEIN: -- the merits of the claim will be dealt with in that litigation with all other RSU claims.

The fact that the RSUs and whether or not they're compensation is certainly an argument that -- people are making in relation to the merits is not determinative as to whether or not they should be treated as priority claims.

Unfortunately the 507 cap to the extent these claims are priority, the cap still applies to them, and there's no circumstances under which the claim can be allowed in a priority amount's great than 10,950. And even if that -- and it's still unclear whether or not that will even happen based on the RSU litigation.

So a majority of these RSUs I would add were earned starting -- again, starting in 2003, going up to 2007, and not within 180 days as required by the statute. There does appear to be a small portion of less than \$10,000 that was earned within the RSUs that were distributed in I think July or August of 2008. But even that amount is below the cap which we're seeking to, at least at this point, permit the claim to remain standing in the priority amount.

So we believe the objection should be granted, and

any amounts in excess of the cap should be classified as unsecured claims.

THE COURT: Well, let me understand and in asking this question, it may also help Ms. Kreiger understand precisely what this objection is seeking to do.

Is it correct that the only thing that you are seeking to do is to treat her claim as misclassified to the extent that it seeks priority treatment of the entirety of her RSU claim, and that what you are seeking to do is to reclassify it so that anything in excess of the \$10,950 cap of 507(a) becomes an unsecured claim, with the understanding that it becomes an unsecured claim that is subject to an ongoing objection to have it reclassified as equity?

MR. BERNSTEIN: That's exactly what we're seeking to do in this objection.

THE COURT: All right. The objection as it relates to this claim is allowed without prejudice to Ms. Kreiger's ability to continue to prosecute her rights with respect to further reclassification of the claim to equity.

I would note that issues relating to the proper classification and treatment of RSU related claims remains an ongoing and unresolved issue in the case. And based upon an argument that took place several months ago, it's my understanding that it will take a considerable period of time for the parties who are involved in this to complete

Page 47 1 requested discovery to file supplemental papers if any are 2 going to be filed, and for the disputes that are at issue 3 here, to be fully ripe for adjudication. 4 Nothing that's happening with respect to the 329th 5 omnibus objection to claims will impact in any way the 6 resolution of that unresolved question. 7 I view Ms. Kreiger's statements just made as 8 statements that primarily relate to the broader question of 9 how RSUs are to be classified. And there's nothing that has 10 been said either by her or by me in this regard that will 11 impact the ultimate decision, although what she has said 12 today may well be incorporated into the record or become 13 part of the record in some other way when that matter is 14 heard on the merits. 15 MR. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, that concludes the 16 agenda for today's hearing. 17 THE COURT: Fine. We're adjourned until next time, 18 thank you. 19 (Proceedings concluded at 11:18 AM) 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	Pg 48 of 49 of 10 LD 11 (05, 11 (0.1, L1)		
		Page 48	
1	RULINGS		
2			
3	DESCRIPTION	PAGE	LINE
4	Kuykendall - 329th Omnibus Objection	40	6
5	to Claims		
6			
7	Kreiger - 329th Omnibus Objection	46	16
8	to Claims		
9			
10			
11			
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Page 49 CERTIFICATION 1 2 I, Sheila G. Orms, certify that the foregoing is a correct 3 transcript from the official electronic sound recording of 4 the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 5 September 28, 2012 6 Dated: Sheila Digitally signed by Sheila Orms DN: cn=Sheila Orms, o, ou, 7 email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2012.09.28 15:00:08 -04'00' 8 Orms 9 Signature of Approved Transcriber 10 11 Veritext 12 200 Old Country Road 13 Suite 580 14 Mineola, NY 11501 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25